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This paper introduces learning dynamics into a posted-o⁄er pricing game, in which
sellers observe past-period transactions before announcing a take-it or leave-it price,
and buyers either accept or reject the announced price. We consider the impact that
seller access to information regarding past transaction has on the long-term prices,
and show that when sellers have imperfect information about the past, the long-term
average sale price may be higher than when sellers perfectly observe the entire history
of the game. It follows that limiting seller information can improve their long-term
average welfare, and total long-term average sales revenue. This has interesting impli-
cations regarding ￿rm incentives to provide information to their managers and sales
agents.
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11 Introduction
Basic models of market interaction assume the price-setting sellers have full knowledge of
the price-taking buyers￿willingness to pay for the product, and are thereby able to accu-
rately set a price that maximizes pro￿ts. In reality, however, this is often not the case.
With few exceptions, sellers are not endowed with a perfect understanding of buyer demand.
Additionally, undertaking costly preliminary market research rarely results in certainty re-
garding the pro￿t maximizing price, although it may narrow down a potential price range.
Instead, sellers usually learn about buyer willingness to pay over time, as they observe past
transactions and update their beliefs as more information becomes available.
To deal with similar dynamics, a number of learning models have developed in the lit-
erature (for an overview, see Weibull 1995, or Young 2005). In these models, the long-term
outcome depends on the learning rules, or more speci￿cally, on the agent sophistication and
ability to observe past periods, which may also be referred to as their memory. Processes
in which agents observe only the outcome of the previous period will likely have a di⁄erent
long-term outcome than processes in which agents observe, and therefore learn from, the
entire history of the game. For example, Hurkens (1995) shows how large enough memory of
recent periods can limit the potential strategy set of the agents in a learning game. Young
(1993b) shows how su¢ ciently small memory can increase the likelihood of certain outcomes
in a bargaining game, such as 50-50 division. This paper incorporates learning dynamics
into a simple ultimatum posted price game, and considers how di⁄erent memory limits can
in￿ uence the long-run prices that are announced over the course of the game. Speci￿cally,
we consider whether limiting seller memory (or ability to observe past periods) can result in
higher average sale prices, thereby increasing long-run seller welfare, or whether sellers are
strictly better o⁄ if they can observe all past transactions.
This paper￿ s model is built on the framework used in Young￿ s evolutionary bargaining
model (1993b). Similar to Young￿ s model, this paper considers an in￿nitely repeated stage
game, where, in each period, two agents are randomly matched to play against each other.
2In Young￿ s model, these agents were a landlord and a potential tenant, and in our model,
they are a seller and a potential buyer of a good or service. Additionally, rather than the
split-the-dollar bargaining game employed by Young, we use a repeated posted o⁄er game in
which only the seller is able to announce a take-it or leave-it price, and the buyer can only
accept or reject this price. These di⁄erences allow us to address a typical market transaction
in which one party sets a non-negotiable price for a good or service.1
In each period, an agent from the pool of sellers is randomly matched with a buyer
to play that period￿ s stage game. After being selected, the seller observes a partial or
complete history of the game, including prices announced in past periods and whether they
were accepted or rejected. Then the seller updates her expectations regarding the buyer￿ s
valuation, and announces her own price. The buyer can either accept or reject the price. If
he accepts the price, the buyer receives a payo⁄equal to the di⁄erence between his valuation
and the price, and the seller receives payo⁄ equal to the price. If he rejects the price, both
the buyer and the seller receive a payo⁄ of zero. Even though no negotiation takes place
between the seller and the buyer in this model, the interpretation of this model need not be
so limited. In situations where a sales agent and a buyer expect to negotiate over a price, this
model may still apply so long as the range of prices over which they negotiate is relatively
small compared to the entire range of possible buyer valuations.
In this model￿ s framework, we analyze three cases of seller information. In the ￿rst case,
sellers always observe all past transactions, and are therefore perfectly informed of the entire
history of the game. In contrast, the second and third cases both involve imperfect seller
information. In the second case, sellers observe only the m most recent transactions. In
the third case, sellers observe each past period transaction with an independent positive
probability, and therefore it is possible to observe any subset of the complete history of the
game.
1In contrast, in Young￿ s (1993b) primary example, randomly matched landlords and tenants both an-
nounce demands over the division of a crop. They both receive their announced division if and only if the
sum of the two divisions is less than or equal to the total.
3For all three of these cases, we show that the pricing process settles to long-run con-
ventions, which we de￿ne in detail in the following section. Once the process settles to a
long-run convention, the price associated with the convention is the only price at which sales
take place in any future period. Convention prices are necessarily no larger than the buyer
valuation, and are therefore always accepted. When sellers have perfect information of past
transactions (case 1), the process settles to a permanent convention, p￿
pc. Once established, a
permanent convention price is announced by sellers in all future periods. When observations
are limited to the most recent periods (case 2), the process eventually settles to a repeatedly-
reoccurring convention, p￿
rrc. After p￿
rrc is established, sellers occasionally experiment with
higher prices that are rejected by the buyer; however, the process always returns to p￿
rrc. In
the long run, the probability that p￿
rrc is announced and therefore accepted in any period
approaches some constant. When sellers observe each past period with positive probability
(case 3), the process achieves a convention in probability, p￿
cip. A process achieves a conven-
tion in probability p￿
cip when the probability that any seller announces p￿
cip approaches 1 in
the long run.
When a seller announces her price in any period, the price is determined after considering
the observed past accepted and rejected prices. A seller will always announce a price at least
as large as the maximum past accepted price she observed, pmin, and strictly less than the
minimum past rejected price she observed, pmax. This is because she knows that the buyer
valuation is within this potential price range. When a convention is achieved, all sellers prefer
to announce the convention price p￿ = pmin rather than any other p 2 [pmin;pmax).
Under reasonable conditions, providing sellers with imperfect observation of past trans-
actions (whether by limiting memory to the most recent periods or randomly determining
which past periods the sellers observe) can cause the process to achieve a long-term con-
vention price that is closer to the buyer valuation than the long-term convention price that
would be established if sellers perfectly observed all past transactions. The reasons and
requirements for this are presented in detail in the body of the paper. In summary, the
4primary reason that imperfect information can result in a higher long-term price compared
to perfect information is that it may result in sellers observing potential price ranges that
are not observed under perfect information. For example, suppose that sellers observe only
the m most recent transactions, and the process converges to a temporary convention with
potential price range [p￿
pc;pmax), where pt = pmax was announced (and rejected) in period
t. From when this convention is achieved through period t + m all sellers announce p￿
pc,
and the potential price range remains constant between periods. With perfect information,
we would remain here inde￿nitely. However, with m-period memory, the seller in period
t + m + 1 no longer observes pmax since it was originally announced more than m periods
before. When this happens, the upper bound of the seller￿ s potential price range reverts back
to the absolute maximum price that the seller believes possible, and the period t+m+1 seller
now chooses a price out of a larger potential range. The seller may now choose a di⁄erent
price rather than p￿
pc. This new experimentation can result in a new price being announced
between p￿
pc and the buyer valuation. If this happens, any future convention price, including
p￿
rrc, will be at least as large as this new price.
Alternatively, when sellers observe each past period with positive probability, there is
a positive probability that a seller observe any subset of the complete game history. Now,
suppose that at some point a seller observes a selection of past price histories such that she
announces price p￿
pc. In the periods that follow, there is a positive probability that sellers
observe price histories such that pmin = p￿
pc, and also a positive probability that pmax equals
any of the past rejected prices. Therefore, when sellers observe pmin = p￿
pc, they do not
necessarily observe the same pmax they would have under perfect information (for which
p￿
pc is the optimal price for all sellers). Instead, their observation set may result in a pmax
such that the resulting potential price range [p￿
pc;pmax) was never observed as the process
converged under perfect information. When this happens, p￿
pc may not be the optimal price
announcement, and the seller may announce some new price larger than p￿
pc and less than
the buyer valuation. If this happens, any future convention price, including p￿
cip, will be at
5least as large as this new price.
After we analyze the three cases of information, we consider an application of the model
that treats the entire pool of sellers as a ￿rm, and the individual sales agents within the pool
as employees or managers acting on behalf of the ￿rm. Because sellers￿incentives often di⁄er
from those of the ￿rm owners, sellers may choose actions that do not maximize ￿rm earnings
(Basu, et al 1985; Holmstrom 1999). Our model can address the ￿rm-employee relationship
when ￿rm owners are more concerned with long-term performance, than performance on
individual projects or sales. For example, consider an automobile dealership that is primarily
concerned about annual or quarterly sales revenue, while its sales agents may be primarily
concerned with immediate sales. To help align employee behavior with ￿rm preferences,
the ￿rms may bene￿t from encouraging risk taking among its sales agents, since risk taking
can push long-term convention prices closer to the buyer valuation. This result supports
a variety of past literature that shows how a ￿rm can bene￿t from a⁄ecting employee risk
preferences through compensation schemes such as standard employment contracts, sales
contests, quotas, and promotion rules (see for example Wilson 1968; Ross 1973; and Gaba
and Kalra 1999). Our analysis contributes to this literature by showing how ￿rms may also
achieve similar results by limiting seller access to information regarding past transactions.
Given costs associated with the standard compensation tools, information limits may be a
less costly or more e⁄ective alternative. As far as we know, this is the ￿rst paper showing
how employee information limits can have equivalent result on employee behavior as more
standard compensation tools.
Section 2 describes the model and de￿nes the dynamic price process. Section 3 analyses
the convergence of the process under the three cases of information limits and considers the
requirements for imperfect information to result in higher average seller utility compared
with perfect information of past transactions. The section also considers the application of
the model to the ￿rm-seller relationship, and discusses what happens when the sellers do not
fully discount future periods. The ￿nal section of the paper presents the concluding remarks,
6including a brief discussion regarding possible expansions of this paper.
2 Model
There are two pools of individuals, A and B. A represents the class of sellers of a good or
service, and B represents the class of buyers of that good or service. The game has an in￿nite
time horizon, and in each period t = 1;2;3;::: one seller ￿ is drawn at random from class A,
and one buyer ￿ is drawn at random from class B. Where required for clarity, we use the
notation ￿t to represent the seller that is selected to play in period t. ￿ then observes some
past period transactions, and can update her expectations regarding the buyer￿ s willingness
to pay for the good. The seller then announces a price p for the good or service, and ￿
chooses whether to accept or reject the price. If the buyer, ￿, accepts the price, he receives
a payo⁄ equal to the di⁄erence between his valuation and the price (V￿ ￿ p), and the seller
receives a payo⁄equal to the price p. If the buyer rejects the price, the transaction does not
take place, and both the buyer and seller receive nothing. This price setting process changes
the underlying game in Young￿ s bargaining model (1993b), but retains many similarities in
structure with his model.
Buyers are de￿ned by their valuation for the good, which is denoted V￿. For technical
reasons, similar to Young (1993b), we assume that there exists a ￿nite number of feasible
prices and valuations. This assures that the process can converge to a price convention
in which the same prices are necessarily announced in sequential periods, rather than only
allowing the process to converge to prices arbitrarily close to the convention value.2 Let
there be r feasible prices and valuations along the continuum [Vmin;Vmax], and let ￿ denote
the precision of the price range, where ￿ =
Vmax￿Vmin
r￿1 . Therefore, p and V￿ are in the set
fVmin;Vmin + ￿;:::;Vmax ￿ ￿;Vmaxg; however, through some abuse of notation, we refer to this
2Most results do not change if we assume a continuum of potential prices and allow a convention at price
p to be achieved when price announcements are necessarily within a neighborhood su¢ ciently close to p.
Further development of the convention concept can be found in Young (1993a).
7discrete set of potential prices by the notation D = [Vmin;Vmax].3
Seller types can di⁄er in terms of their utility functions, and their ex ante expectations
regarding potential buyer valuations. Seller utility depends on the price received for the
good. Generally, sellers may have di⁄erent utility functions u￿ (p); although, for all sellers,
u(Vmin) > 0, u(0) = 0, and u0 (p) > 0. If the individual sellers are thought of as risk-neutral
￿rms within a trade organization, then u00 (p) = 0. If the sellers are sales agents within a
￿rm, as generally assumed, then the structure of their utility functions are likely to depend
on the compensation agreements they have with their ￿rm (Basu, et al 1985; Holmstrom
1999). Therefore, u00 (p) > 0, u00 (p) = 0, and u00 (p) < 0 are all possible.
Additionally, sellers cannot observe buyer willingness to pay for the good. However,
sellers do have expectations regarding the distribution of the buyer valuation. Let the CDF
￿ F￿ (￿) represent seller ￿￿ s ex ante beliefs regarding the possible distribution of the buyer
valuation V￿, and ￿ f￿ (￿) represent the distribution￿ s density, such that ￿ f￿ (P) > 0 for all
P 2 [Vmin;Vmax]. Therefore, when selected to play the game, prior to updating beliefs, sellers
believe that any of the potential valuations on D are possible.
Because the primary focus of this paper involves seller decision process and the impact of
their actions on seller and ￿rm welfare, a few simplifying assumptions are made regarding the
class of buyers. First, a buyer￿ s type is de￿ned by its valuation V￿ alone. Second, the class
of buyers is homogeneous in valuation. This second assumption may also be thought of as
sellers having the ability to distinguish buyers of di⁄erent types, even if they cannot observe
the valuation associated with the types.4 Finally, buyers are non-strategic, and accept any
price less than their valuation, p ￿ V￿. This may be because buyers completely discount
future periods, or because they are selected to play the ultimatum game at most once, then
are replaced by an identical buyer.
3Vmin and Vmax are de￿ned by the sellers￿beliefs. We assume that the sellers are correct in that V￿ 2
[Vmin;Vmax]:
4For example, an auto mechanic may not know the valuation that each driver places on his services.
However, if all sellers that drive the same type of car have the same valuation, and he observes car type,
then the results in this model continue to hold.
8On the other hand, the pool of sellers may be composed of di⁄erent seller types, as de￿ned
by their utility functions and prior beliefs regarding buyer valuation. We can interpret the
pool of sellers in a variety of ways. In the ￿rst interpretation, sellers are non-strategic, either
because they completely discount future periods, or, similar to Young (1993b), they only
play the ultimatum game once, then exit the pool and are replaced by an identical agent. In
the second interpretation, there are a ￿nite number of sellers, each of which has a positive
probability of being drawn to play in any given period. In this case, the ￿nite number
of sellers can be thought of as a sales or management team within the ￿rm. Their concern
regarding future periods depends on their individual discount rates, as well as the probability
they will be drawn in any given period. In the third interpretation, there is a single seller
(executive, manager, etc.) who is selected to play the game in each period for sure. In this
case, the seller￿ s concern for the future depends only on her discount rate. This paper and its
analyses focus on the case where sellers as non-strategic regarding future periods. However,
under reasonable conditions, the conclusions in this paper can be generalized for any of the
three interpretations above. These conditions are further discussed below.
Let pt denote the price announced by the seller in period t, and let at 2 f0;1g be an
indicator variable describing whether pt was accepted by the buyer in that period. at = 1
if and only if the buyer accepted pt. Therefore, the set (pt;at) denotes the price history for
period t, and the sequence Ht = f(p1;a1);(p2;a2);:::;(pt￿1;at￿1)g denotes the complete price
history of the game up to period t. For consistency, let HA
t denote the set of all past prices
within Ht that were accepted, and HR
t denote the set of all past prices within Ht that were
rejected. Additionally, Kt denotes the set of price histories observed by the seller selected
to play the ultimatum game in period t. The analysis begins by considering the case where
Kt = Ht, then considers the impact of limiting seller information such that Kt ￿ Ht.
When the class of buyers is homogeneous, they share the same valuation of the good.
Therefore, the seller knows that the buyer valuation is at least as large as the maximum
accepted price and less than the minimum rejected price in the seller￿ s observed price history.
9To formalize this process, let PA ￿ Kt be the subset of all observed past-period prices
that were accepted; and let PR ￿ Kt be the subset of observed past-period prices that
were rejected.5 Then we can de￿ne pmin
t = maxfp j p 2 PAg and pmax
t = minfp j p 2 PRg.
Therefore, pmin
t is the maximum observed accepted price and pmax
t is the minimum observed
rejected price at period t. If PA is an empty set, then pmin
t = Vmin. If PR is an empty set,
then pmax
t = ￿ + Vmax. The set of feasible prices and valuations
￿
pmin;pmin + ￿;:::;pmax ￿ ￿
￿
de￿nes the potential price range. Through abuse of notation, this discrete set is referred to
by the notation [pmin;pmax). Therefore, the relevant data contained in the observation set
is contained in the values of pmin and pmax, and the seller e⁄ectively ignores the rest of the
observations.
After observing Kt, the seller then updates her beliefs regarding the buyer valuation,
forming a new CDF F￿t (P j Kt) de￿ned by the density function f￿t (P j Kt). With a homo-

























￿ F￿ (pmax ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿ F￿ (pmin ￿ ￿)
(1)
for all P 2 [pmin;pmax), and 0 otherwise. Sellers update their beliefs in the same way whether
they observe a partial or a complete history of the game.6
5The A in PA is not related to the class of ￿rms, also de￿ned by A.
6In some sense, this means that the sellers do not fully understand the multiple-period game in which they
play a role. When they observe a partial history of the game, they do not use their information to infer what
the complete history of the game may look like. An alternative assumption would give the individual sellers
complete understanding the multiple-period game, and enable them to determine the exact probability of
all possible true state of the game, given their observations, and act accordingly. With these fully-rational
sellers, the analysis produces similar results regarding the potential bene￿ts of limited memory. However,
the range of parameter values over which the bene￿ts hold are reduced. We believe that the assumptions
involving the agents in this paper￿ s model better represent the participants in most real world transactions
compared to fully-rational agents.
At this point, I do not provide much of a discussion regarding the model if the class of buyers is hetero-
geneous. However, I will brie￿ y discuss the di⁄erences in setup, between the cases of heterogeneous and
homogeneous buyers. In the case of heterogeneous buyers, the seller can no longer update its CDF while
only considering the highest accepted price demand, and the lowest rejected price demand, as can be done
for homogeneous sellers. Instead, the sellers must allow for di⁄erent buyers to have di⁄erent valuations. This
may be done through a general updated CDF F (P j Kt) which is de￿ned by the densities f (P j Kt), such
10Throughout this paper, we concentrate on Nash equilibria in which a buyer always accepts
a price when it is less than or equal to the buyer￿ s valuation, where p ￿ V￿. The seller chooses
p, and gets p if and only if p ￿ V￿. The probability that a seller believes that a price p will
be accepted is therefore given by an expression involving the updated CDF F￿ (￿):
Prfp ￿ V￿g = 1 ￿ F￿t (p ￿ ￿ j Kt) (2)
Prfp ￿ V￿g = 1 ￿ F￿t
￿







Including ￿ in the expression is necessary given the properties of the discrete potential price
set, where Prfp < V￿g = 1 ￿ F (p), and ￿ is the minimum possible increase in price.
Therefore, seller ￿ solves:
max
p2D
u￿ (p)[1 ￿ F￿t (p ￿ ￿ j Kt)] (4)
The agents￿response rules determine a stationary Markov chain. Let ￿￿ (p j Ht) be the
conditional probability that seller ￿ announces price p given that ￿ is selected to play the
game at time t, and that the history of the game is given by Ht. Assume that ￿￿ is a best reply
distribution; that is, ￿￿ (p j Ht) > 0 if and only if p 2 argmaxp u￿ (p)[1 ￿ F￿t (p ￿ ￿ j Kt)].
Ht+1 is a successor of Ht if Ht ￿ Ht+1, such that Ht+1 has the same price history as Ht up
through time t￿1, but also has an additional price history for period t given by (pt;at). Let
￿ (￿) be the probability that ￿ is drawn to play the period ultimatum game in any period.
Every ￿ 2 A has a positive probability of being drawn, though it is not necessarily the same
probability for all agents. If the process has history Ht at time t, then it has history Ht+1
that





￿ ￿ f (P)




(1 ￿ an)(1 ￿ bn)
￿
where K is the set describing the k past periods observed by ￿, and bn 2 f0;1g is an indicator variable such
that bn = 1 i⁄ P ￿ pn. F (P) may reasonably take another form, so long as it combines the seller￿ s prior
beliefs and observations into a new CDF.




￿ (￿)￿￿ (p j Ht) (5)
If Ht+1 is not a successor of Ht, then ￿HtHt+1 = 0. This Markov process will be called the
dynamic price process with precision ￿, memory m, and best reply distribution p￿.7
3 Analysis
The analysis begins by introducing the concepts that the analysis incorporates. We then
consider the case in which sellers learn about the complete history of the game before an-
nouncing a price in any period. We can think of this as the sellers being perfectly informed
about all past sales, or that they observe all past transactions and have in￿nite length mem-
ory. After analyzing the case of perfect information, we consider the impact that limiting
seller access to information (or limiting memory) has on the long-term convergence of the
price-setting process. We consider two cases of limited memory. In the ￿rst, sellers observe
only the most recent m period transactions. In the second, the sellers observe each period
transaction with probability ￿ 2 (0;1). Following these analyses, we consider an application
of the model to address the relationship between ￿rms and their sales agents, and discuss
how our results remain unchanged when sellers do not completely discount future periods.
3.1 Conventions
In any period t, after observing a potential price range [pmin
t ;pmax
t ), the randomly drawn














7If the pool of buyers is composed of di⁄erent types, then the dynamic price demand process evolves




￿2B ￿ (￿;￿)￿￿ (p j Ht), where ￿ (￿;￿) is the probability that ￿ and ￿ are
drawn to play against each other in any period. ￿ (￿) =
P
￿ ￿ (￿;￿).
12A seller always selects a price contained within her potential price range, since any price
above the range is rejected for sure, and any price below the range always results in lower
earnings compared to pmin
t , which is accepted for sure. Additionally, note that pmin
t is the
only price in the potential price range that is accepted for sure, and for every other price
within the range, the seller recognizes a positive probability that the buyer will reject the
price. A seller is said to experiment with price if she announces a price that may be accepted







Alternatively, the seller can not experiment and choose to receive price pmin
t for sure.
The process is said to converge in period t if the potential price range in period t+1 is a
non-equal subset of the potential price range in period t. Under perfect information of game
history, the potential price range can only converge or remain constant, and converges in







imperfect information of game history, the potential price range can potentially expand
between periods, and convergence is not guaranteed.
The analysis is primarily concerned with comparing the long-term (asymptotic) prices
established given di⁄erent rules regarding the ability of the class of sellers to observe past
period transactions. To accomplish this, we focus on the establishment of conventions, or
states in which all possible sellers in any period prefer to announce the lower bound of the
potential price range, which the get for sure, rather than any other possible price. When a
convention is established, all sellers believe that the potential bene￿t (in terms of increased
sales price) from experimenting, is out weighed by the potential loss due to the possibility
that the price is rejected. The basic concept of a convention is formalized in a pair of related
de￿nitions.8
De￿nition 1 The process achieves a common action at time t and price p￿ when p￿ 2
argmaxp u￿ (p)[1 ￿ F￿ (p ￿ ￿ j Kt)] for all ￿ 2 A.
8However, although the de￿nitions of conventions are similar between this paper and Young (1993b),
the di⁄erences in the models￿framework mean that the concept must be rede￿ned here. Young de￿nes a
convention: "A state s is a convention if it consists of some ￿xed division (x;1 ￿ x) repeated m times in
succession, where x 2 D and 0 < x < 1."
13De￿nition 2 The process maintains a convention at time t+1 when the process achieves






















p ￿ ￿ j pmin;pmax￿￿
is possible, then
we can be assured that the p￿ associated with a convention in period t is the unique solution




p ￿ ￿ j pmin;pmax￿￿
. It also follows
that p￿
t = pmin
t when there is a convention in period t. In the analysis that follows, we are
concerned with three speci￿c re￿nements of this concept that arise in the long-run. The
￿rst two re￿nements, permanent and repeatedly-reoccurring conventions, strengthen the
standard de￿nition of a convention. A permanent convention refers to a convention that,
once established, remains established in all future periods of the game. As discussed in detail
below, this concept necessarily results in the case of perfect information of past transactions.
De￿nition 3 A permanent convention is achieved at time t and price p￿ when p￿ 2
argmaxp u￿ (p)[1 ￿ F￿ (p ￿ ￿ j Kt)] for all possible ￿, and pt = p￿ implies ps = p￿ for all
s > t.
Generally, once a convention is established, the process can leave the convention, and
possibly converges to a new convention with a di⁄erent potential price range than the original
convention. A special case of this temporary convention happens when the process necessarily
converges back to the same convention that it left. This concept is called a repeatedly-
reoccurring convention. Once a repeatedly-reoccurring convention is established, it is the
only convention that is achieved through all future periods of the game; however, the process
routinely leaves the convention, only to return to it again in a future period.
De￿nition 4 p￿ is a repeatedly-reoccurring convention if there exists a t such that in
all periods following period t, the process ￿uctuates between being in convention p￿ and not
being in any convention at all.
14The third concept weakens the standard de￿nition of a convention. Unlike after one of
the other types of conventions results, when a convention in probability is established, the
probability that the convention price is announced in any given period may be less than one.
However, over the long run, this probability approaches one.
De￿nition 5 p￿ is a convention in probability if as t ! 1, Pr(pt = p￿) ! 1 (the
probability that pt = p￿ approaches 1), for all sellers.
A permanent convention is a special case of a convention in probability.
3.2 Perfect Information of Past Transactions
When sellers have perfect information of past transactions, they observe all of the past
prices in the game, and whether the prices were accepted or rejected by the buyers. This
means that the set of prices observed by a seller always contains the prices observed by
sellers in past periods, and may also include some additional more recent prices. Since
relevant seller information is completely de￿ned by the potential price range, it follows that
[pmin
s ;pmax
s ) ￿ [pmin
t ;pmax
t ) for all periods t and s > t, with equality possible. Therefore,
under perfect information of past transactions, the potential price range either converges or







, then the seller announces a price that has not been announced before,
and all future sellers can observe whether this new price was accepted or rejected. If pt is
rejected, it becomes the new minimum rejected price observed by the seller in period t + 1;
if it is accepted, it becomes the new maximum accepted price observed by the seller in
period t+1. Experimentation necessarily results in the potential price range in period t+1
being a non-equal subset of the potential price range in period t. Therefore, under perfect
information of past transactions, experimentation necessarily results in convergence of the
potential price range.
15Alternatively, if the seller chooses pt = pmin
t , then no new price announcements are avail-
able to the seller in the following period, and the process does not converge in period t.
Because sellers may di⁄er in terms of their expectations and risk preferences, ￿t￿ s announce-
ment of pt = pmin
t does not imply that all other possible sellers also ￿nd it optimal to select
pmin







t at time t,
then given a in￿nite time horizon, such a seller will eventually be drawn, and the process
will necessarily converge further. Only when, given the potential price range, all possible
sellers prefer to announce the lower bound on the potential price range pmin
t will the process
no longer converge. When this happens, the process achieves a convention. Because there
only exists a ￿nite number of possible prices, the process can only converge a ￿nite number
of times, and in the long run a convention will eventually be achieved. Additionally, when a
convention is established, no new price observations become available to sellers in the follow-
ing period; and perfect information implies that all price information that was available to a
seller in one period is also observed by all sellers in future periods. These two factors mean
that once a convention is established, all future periods result in an equivalent potential price
range, and therefore the convention is a permanent convention.
Proposition 6 When sellers have perfect knowledge of the game history, the process almost
surely converges to a permanent convention.
This proposition tells us that under perfect information of game history the process will
eventually settle to a state in which the same price is announced and accepted period after
period, and that the process remains in that state inde￿nitely. As the following proposition
states, the permanent convention price may be less than the buyers￿valuation.
Proposition 7 If V￿ > Vmin, then, given agents￿utility functions, there exists some distri-
bution of prior beliefs regarding V￿ such that the permanent convention price p￿ is less than
the buyers￿valuation (p￿ < V￿).9
9Alternatively, this proposition can be changed to ￿x the agents￿ex ante beliefs, and then increase the
risk aversion of sellers until a similar result is established.
16This means that the long-term price may be less than buyers are willing to pay, even
if the sellers have perfect information regarding the transaction history of the game. This
result follows simply from the sellers￿expected utility maximization problem. In any period,
sellers can always announce the minimum potential price, and receive it for sure. Although
experimenting with a higher price results in the possibility of receiving a higher price, it also
results in the increased possibility of having their price rejected and receiving nothing. This
result may hold, even if the sellers are highly risk seeking in sales price.
Consider this simple example. Let all members of the class of sellers be risk neutral in
sales price, and initially believe that the possible buyer valuation be uniformly distributed
from Vmin = 1, and Vmax = 100, where ￿ = 1, and actual buyer valuation V￿ = 45. The ￿rst
seller to play the game observes pmin
1 = 1 and pmax
1 = 101, and chooses p1 = 50 to maximize
her expected utility, which is rejected. In the following period, pmin
2 = 1 and pmax
2 = 50,
and ￿2 announces p2 = 25, which is accepted. Now, in the third period, pmin
3 = 25 and
pmax
3 = 50, and ￿3 elects not to experiment, and announces p3 = 25, which she receives for
sure. No further price information is available to the seller in the following period, or any
future period, and therefore the sellers in the following periods choose the same price pt = 25
for all t = 3;4;:::. Therefore, a permanent convention is achieved at a price signi￿cantly less
than the buyer valuation of 45.
Even when sellers can observe all past transactions in the game, the long-term price
may be less than the buyers are willing to pay. Therefore, p￿
pc may be less than the buyer
valuation V￿. The di⁄erence between the permanent convention price p￿
pc and V￿ depends on
the evolution of the price process as it converges to a convention. The path of convergence
depends on the ex ante expectations that sellers have over the buyer￿ s valuations ￿ F￿ (￿), the
form of the sellers￿utility functions u￿ (￿), and the random selection of seller types to play
each stage game. This is true for the convergence under perfect information of past periods,
as well as under bounded memory, which we analyze in the following sections. If sellers place
low enough probability on the buyer valuation being equal to the actual valuation, then even
17the extremely risk-seeking seller may choose a lower price. Alternatively, even if sellers have
highly-accurate beliefs, if they are also highly risk averse, the permanent convention price
can still be less than the buyer valuation.
Typically, we treat the seller risk preferences and ex ante beliefs regarding the buyer
valuation as ￿xed. However, it is interesting to consider what would happen to the long-
term convention price if we altered these factors. Remember, we restrict the priors of the
sellers by requiring them all to place a positive ex ante probability on all prices within the
original range of potential valuations P 2 [Vmin;Vmax]. Increasing the accuracy of these
beliefs therefore involves increasing ￿ f￿ (V￿), the ex ante probability placed on the true buyer
valuation, while decreasing the probability placed on all other valuations. Similarly, sellers
may di⁄er in terms of their risk preferences, and changes to these preferences may result in
sellers becoming either more risk seeking or more risk averse over the entire range of their
respective function.
A large-enough increase in risk seeking preferences or the accuracy of beliefs will result
in a permanent convention price that is at least as large as the resulting price without the
increase. Holding the ex ante beliefs of all sellers and the utility functions of all but any one
seller constant, it is possible to increase the risk-seeking preferences of the one seller such
that the permanent convention price equals the buyer valuation V￿. Similarly, holding the
utility functions of all sellers and the ex ante beliefs of all except any one seller constant,
it is possible to increase the accuracy of the one seller￿ s ex ante beliefs regarding the buyer
valuation such that the permanent convention price equals the buyer valuation V￿. These
two results hold regardless of which seller types are drawn to play the stage game in each
period leading up to the establishment of the convention. Note also that depending on the
original characteristics of the sellers, these results may require a very extreme change to
the agent￿ s ex ante beliefs or risk preferences. Relaxing the signi￿cance of the change in
seller characteristic can still result in a guaranteed convention price at least as close to the
buyer valuation as arises without the change, assuming that the change remains signi￿cant
18enough.10
3.3 Limiting Observations to Recent Transactions
The previous section considered the model when sellers have perfect knowledge of the trans-
action histories. This section weakens this assumption, and considers a case where sellers
only have knowledge of the most recent m periods. Because we are concerned with compar-
ing the di⁄erences in agent interactions that result when class A agents have ￿nite-period
memory compared to full knowledge of the game, m is assumed to be su¢ ciently large to
make such comparisons reasonable.11
Similar to the analysis of the model under perfect knowledge of past transactions, this
section considers how the process converges to conventions. However, there are some di⁄er-
ences through which the process converges. When a player of type ￿ is drawn to play the
stage game in period t, she observes the most recent m transactions of the game. Therefore,
the bounds on her potential price range are de￿ned as the maximum observed accepted price
(pmin
t ), and the minimum observed rejected price (pmax
t ); they are no longer determined by
the entire history of the game, but just from those observed periods.
With perfect knowledge of past periods, sellers are aware of all past period price an-
nouncements, and therefore the potential price range can only converge, or remain constant
over time. With limited memory (imperfect knowledge) of past period transactions, a price
announcement is forgotten m periods after it is announced. When a bound on the period-t
potential price range is not observed by the seller in the following period, t + 1 (meaning
the bound must have been announced in period t ￿ m), the t + 1 seller necessarily faces a
di⁄erent updated belief distribution than she would have if the bound was observed. This
10In general, increasing the accuracy of ex ante seller beliefs regarding buyer valuation or seller risk seeking
can result in a permanent convention price that is less than the convention price achieved before the increase.
11Any m ￿
Pmax￿V￿
￿ is always su¢ ciently large for all claims in this paper to hold; however, m usually
can be much smaller than that, depending on the speci￿cs of the model parameters. Requiring a su¢ ciently
large m assures that pmin is not forgotten as the sellers experiment with other prices within a potential price
range.
19dynamic has the potential to signi￿cantly change the path of convergence over the course of
the game.
In analyzing this issue, we ￿rst establish that the lower bound of the potential price range
is never forgotten. This follows almost directly from the assumption that memory remains
su¢ ciently large. Suppose that a price announcement is accepted in period t. Therefore, this
price is the lower bound on the potential price range in period t+1. Large-enough memory
ensures that in some period s 2 [t + 1;t + m], before pt is no longer observed, a seller must
either announce a higher price that is accepted, or announce a price ps = pt. In either case,
the lower bound is not forgotten until after period s + m, and the reasoning repeats itself.
Therefore, the lower bound on the potential price range will only converge toward the buyer
valuation, or remain constant between periods.
Alternatively, the upper bound will eventually be forgotten, at which time the upper
bound on the potential price range reverts back to V max + ￿. As long as a rejected past
price announcement is observed by the sellers, it will not be announced again since sellers
recognize that it results in a payo⁄ of zero for sure. If an upper bound is maintained for m
sequential periods, it is forgotten in the following period. This happens whenever all price
announcements over the m periods are accepted. When the process achieves a convention
the upper bound will necessarily be in place for m sequential periods. However, achieving a
convention is not required for the upper bound to be forgotten.
The seller in the period in which the upper bound on the potential price range is forgotten
then update her expectations regarding buyer valuation according to Equation 1, in which
pmax now equals Vmax + ￿. Remember that this implies that sellers are naive in the sense
that when they observe no rejected values, they do not infer that some rejected prices may
have been experienced in the past, then forgotten. A further discussion of this assumption
is provided in Footnote 6.
Because of the di⁄erent potential price ranges that arise under imperfect and perfect
information, the path of convergence may di⁄er between the two cases, even when the same
20agent types are drawn to play the game in each period. This follows because the optimal
price given a potential price range may not also be the optimal price if the upper bound on
the potential price range is forgotten.















p ￿ ￿ j p
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w ;Vmax + ￿
￿￿
With imperfect information of past periods, the process will converge to and achieve a
convention, provided that seller memory is su¢ ciently large. The process converges to a
convention in a similar fashion to the permanent convention in the previous section; however,
a permanent convention is generally no longer achieved. Alternatively, we are concerned with
repeatedly-reoccurring conventions, as de￿ned above.
When a convention is eventually established, limits to seller memory mean that the
process will not generally remain in the convention inde￿nitely. When the upper bound of
the potential price range is no longer observed, the process generally leaves the convention.
The process will again converge to another convention, that may or may not be at the same
price. However, eventually, the process will achieve a convention ^ p, such that after the
process leaves the convention, it necessarily re-converges to a new convention at the same
price ^ p. This necessary re-convergence will continue to be present the following time the
process leaves the convention, and the process therefore enters a cycle in which the same
convention price reoccurs on an ongoing basis throughout the remainder of the game.
Proposition 8 There exists a value s such that for any memory length m > s, the process
almost surely converges to a repeatedly-reoccurring convention, p￿
rrc.
Intuition for this result is provided here. As discussed above, long-enough memory is
assumed such that sellers can experiment with higher prices (which may be rejected) without
forgetting the value of the most-recent accepted price. This means that the lower bound of
the potential price range is never forgotten, and can therefore only converge or remain
21constant. Given a lower bound of a potential price range pmin, suppose that starting from




there exists some draw order of sellers that results in
the lower bound of the potential price range converging to a higher price. Although this
convergence is not necessarily achieved by any point in time, with an in￿nite time horizon,
if convergence is possible, the lower bound will eventually converge. Since the lower bound
can only converge a ￿nite number of times, the process eventually achieves a state in which
further convergence of the lower bound is not possible. We label this point p￿
rrc. When
this happens, no price higher than p￿
rrc will be accepted in any future period. The process
will ￿ uctuate between having p￿
rrc announced and accepted, and having di⁄erent, higher
prices announced and rejected. If a higher price is accepted, the lower bound will converge
further, which is a contradiction; therefore, no higher price can be accepted. When these
price experiments are rejected, the upper bound on the potential price range converges. If
no experimentation take place for m periods, that means that the upper bound has been
established for m period, and in the following period it reverts back to Vmax+￿. Then, more
experimentation can take place, and the upper bound again converges. This cycle repeats
through the duration of the game.
As this cycle repeats inde￿nitely, p￿
rrc is the only price that is ever announced and ac-
cepted. Notice that a convention involving p￿
rrc may not generally be established prior to an
established upper price range bound being forgotten and the potential price range reverting
back to [p￿
rrc;V max]. However, a convention is achieved at least occasionally when the order of
seller draws cause the upper bound to converge such that all sellers ￿nd it optimal to choose
p￿
rrc. Given our assumptions, this is always possible, and, with an in￿nite time horizon, will
happen on a reoccurring basis. It is important to recognize that the process does not have
to be in a convention in order for sellers to announce p￿
rrc. This is because the drawn sellers
may prefer to announce the price, even if it is not the optimal price for all members of the
class of sellers. In contrast, a convention is only o¢ cially established when all sellers agree
on the optimal price.
22Once the process achieves a repeatedly-reoccurring convention, it follows that, as t ! 1,
the percent of time that p￿
rrc is announced approaches some constant, ￿; and the portion
of time that a price is announced and rejected approaches 1 ￿ ￿. Therefore, whether the
repeatedly-reoccurring convention price can make the average seller better o⁄ depends on
both the relative level of p￿
rrc compared to p￿
pc, and the parameter ￿. This potential bene￿t
is discussed in more detail in another section below.
The position of the repeatedly-reoccurring convention price p￿
rrc relative to V￿ and p￿
pc de-
pends on the order that sellers are randomly drawn to play the period games. The repeatedly-
reoccurring convention price may be closer to the buyer valuation than the permanent con-
vention price that would have been established if all agents had perfect information regarding
past transactions. The following two propositions provide su¢ cient conditions for p￿
rrc to be
at least as large as p￿
pc; however, these are not necessary conditions, and p￿
rrc greater than
p￿
pc can still result even if these conditions are violated.
Proposition 9 Given the order of the seller draws, there exists a value w such that for
any memory length m > w, the process almost surely converges to a repeatedly-reoccurring
convention p￿
rrc, such that p￿
pc ￿ p￿
rrc ￿ V￿, where p￿
pc is the permanent convention price that
would have been established with perfect information.12
If we are certain regarding the seller type that will be drawn to play the game in each
period, we can determine the period in which a process will ￿rst achieve a permanent con-
vention if all sellers had perfect information of past transactions. Denote this period by ~ w.
12This proposition always holds ex post, in that once we know the period in which a permanent convention
is established, we can determine the minimum value of w for the proposition to hold. However, because sellers
are drawn randomly in each period, we can not generally be certain of the order of seller draws, and can not
determine the value of w prior to a game being played. The exception to this is when the class of sellers is
homogenous, or, equivalently, when the class is composed of a single agent. In this case, we are certain as to
the seller type that plays the game in any given period, and can determine the minimum value of w prior to
the game. With a heterogeneous seller class, it is possible to draw the same seller type for any ￿nite number
of periods in a row. For any w that we set prior to the start of the game, there is a positive probability
that the upper bound of the potential price range is forgotten prior to the lower bound of the potential price
range converges to p￿
pc. If this happens, it is possible for the process to achieve a repeatedly-reoccurring
convention price less than p￿
pc. However, if the random draw of sellers is not given, other conditions can help
ensure that the repeatedly-reoccurring convention is at least as close to V￿ as the alternative permanent
convention.
23Any memory length greater than ~ w ensures that the lower bound on the potential price range
converges to p￿
pc before the consequences of limited memory come into play. Additionally,
as we previously discussed, setting memory greater than (Vmax ￿ V￿) 1
￿ is always su¢ cient to
assure that the lower bound of the potential price range can only converge to a higher value
or remain constant. Therefore, it is possible to pick a memory length w high enough to meet
both these requirements. For such a w, once the lower bound achieves the value p￿
pc, any fu-
ture accepted price, including p￿
rrc, will be at least as large as p￿
pc. After the establishment of
p￿
pc, limiting memory will cause the upper bound to occasionally be forgotten, which causes





. When this happens, sellers are faced with
additional potential prices. Depending on their risk preferences and ex ante expectations
regarding buyer valuation, they may decide to experiment further with price. If any of these
further price experimentations are excepted, then the lower bound on the potential price
range converges further, and any future convention will be at a strictly-higher price than p￿
pc.
Even when sellers are not identical, the sellers may be similar enough in terms of their ex
ante beliefs and risk preferences that, under perfect memory, the process always achieves a
permanent convention by some ￿xed period. Such a seller class is called quasi-homogeneous.
De￿nition 10 A class of sellers is quasi-homogeneous if under perfect memory, and the
random draw of sellers, there exists some ￿nite ^ T, such that for any m ￿ ^ T, the process
achieves a permanent convention in the ￿rst s periods of the game with probability one.
When the class of sellers is quasi-homogeneous, it is possible to ￿x a memory length large
enough such that the lower bound on the potential price range will always converge to p￿
pc
before the upper bound is forgotten.
Proposition 11 If the class of sellers is quasi-homogeneous, there exists a value s such that
for any memory length m > s, the process almost surely converges to a repeatedly-reoccurring
convention p￿
rrc, such that p￿
pc ￿ p￿
rrc ￿ V￿, where p￿
pc is the permanent convention price that
would have been established with perfect information.
24The more similar the sellers are in terms of risk preferences and expectations, the more
likely a class of sellers is quasi-homogeneous. Whenever the class of sellers is homogeneous,
this condition always holds, and, with long-enough memory, the repeatedly-reoccurring con-
vention always results in a price at least as close to the buyer valuation as the alternative
permanent convention that would result under perfect information.
As these similar propositions show, limiting seller information to the m most-recent
periods can achieve a long-term convention price at least as close to the buyer valuation as
under perfect information of game history. Because of the random draw of sellers from a
heterogeneous seller class, determining the minimum memory length to achieve this result
is generally not feasible, and the result only holds with certainty in the limit. As memory
increases, but remains ￿nite, the probability that the result holds increases. However, even
though the results only hold with certainty in the limit, these results hold with positive
probability for any m su¢ ciently large. For any memory length above this limit, limiting
observations to recent periods has the potential to result in at least as large of a long-term
convention price, and the potential to increase long-term average seller and class revenues.
3.4 Random Observations of Past Periods
In this section, we no longer limit seller observations to the most recent periods, and instead
allow sellers to observe each of the past transactions with some independent positive prob-
ability ￿ 2 (0;1). ￿ may be constant across all past periods, or it may be decreasing with
distance in time from the current period, such that the more recent the past transaction,
the more likely a seller is to observe it. In each period, there is a positive probability of
observing no past transactions, all of the past transactions, or any incomplete selection of
past periods. Therefore, the process does not generally converge as it did under consecutive
period observations.
Sellers are not aware of the expected values, or the total number of past observations;
they are only aware of the observations they do observe. There always exists a positive
25probability that any price that was previously announced, including pmin
t￿1 or pmax
t￿1, will not
be observed in period t. There is no assurance the potential price range will either remain
constant, or converge. Additionally, if the process converges between periods t ￿ 1 and t,
there is no longer the requirement that either pmin
t = pt￿1 or pmax
t = pt￿1. Therefore, instead
of achieving a permanent or repeatedly-reoccurring convention after some ￿nite number of
periods, the process achieves a convention in probability as t ! 1.
When the process does achieve a convention in probability at price p￿
cip, then as t ! 1,
the probability that pmin
t = p￿








p ￿ ￿ j p￿
cip;pmax￿￿
for all ￿ 2 A
￿
also approaches 1
in the limit. Therefore, in the long run, the convention price p￿
cip is announced almost
all of the time.
Proposition 12 When sellers observe each past period with constant probability ￿, the
process almost surely achieves a convention in probability at price p￿
cip as t ! 1.
The formal proof is reserved for the appendix; however, intuition is provided here. Note
that the more often a price was announced in periods 1 through t ￿ 1, the higher the
probability that it is observed by the seller at time t. The analysis depends on the likelihood
that a price becomes pmin
t or pmax
t in any period t. A past accepted price becomes pmin
t when
it is observed by the seller in period t, and no higher past accepted price is also observed.
The probability that any past price is observed is increasing in the number of past periods
in which it was announced. Therefore, when a price is accepted in period t it reduces
the probability that any lower price will be seen as pmin
t+1. Only the largest accepted price
announced over the course of the game (as t ! 1) is not subject to its probability of being
pmin
t being reduced. We denote this largest accepted price by p￿
cip. It follows that as t ! 1,
the probability that pmin
t = p￿
cip goes to 1.
The upper bound on the potential price range evolves in the limit similar to pmin
t . The
probability that a past rejected price is pmax
t depends on the probability that the price
is observed, and the probability that any lower previously rejected price is also observed.
26Therefore, when a price is rejected in period t it reduces the probability that a higher price
will be pmax
t+1. Only those past rejected prices that when observed cause all sellers ￿ 2 A to
announce a price below the buyer valuation are not necessarily subject to their probabilities
of being pmax
t being reduced as t ! 1. In the long run, the probability that pmax
t equals one
of these immune past rejected prices goes to 1.
It is easy to see that p￿
cip ￿ p￿
pc is possible. Because it is possible to observe any subset
of all past transactions, it is feasible that the seller observe the highest past accepted price
and the lowest past rejected price during the ￿rst ￿ periods of the game. As ￿ increases, this
becomes less likely, but is still possible. In this situation, the process converges just as it
would under perfect information during the ￿rst ￿ periods. For ￿ large enough, the process
will establish price p￿
pc prior to period ￿. Since no long term convention can be established at
a price less than the highest past accepted price, it follows that p￿
cip will be at least as large
as p￿
pc in this case. Therefore, p￿
cip ￿ p￿
pc is possible. If observing some other pmin and pmax in
a period following ￿ causes sellers to experiment with price, they may eventually announce
a new price between p￿
pc and the buyer valuation. If that new price is accepted, then a p￿
cip
strictly greater than p￿
pc is assured.
Proposition 13 There is a strictly positive probability that the convention in probability
price established for any ￿ 2 (0;1) is at least as large as the permanent convention price







Without adopting further assumptions regarding the structure of the sellers￿utility func-
tions (including risk preferences), pre-game beliefs regarding the buyer valuations, or the
size of the original potential price range, we cannot draw more exact conclusions about the
likelihood the process settles to a convention in probability price greater than the permanent
convention price that would have been established under perfect information.13 Generally,
the convention in probability price that a process may settle to ex ante is not unique. De-
13Further research may impose some further structure on the game, and simulate the long term results.
27spite this, we can determine some characteristics of the set of possible ex ante convention in
probability prices.
Let C denote the set of conventions that for all p￿ 2 C:
1. p￿ may be achieved following the initial game period in which the price history is an
empty set;
2. p￿ may be the maximum past rejected price when there ￿rst exists some pmax within the
set of past rejected prices, such that [p￿;pmax) would form a convention under perfect
information; and
3. for all pmax within HR (p￿), a period-t potential price range [p￿;pmax) necessarily implies
that either pt = p￿ or pt 2 HR (p￿). HR (p￿) is the set of rejected past prices as t ! 1
when the convention in probability settles to p￿.
Let ￿(p￿) denote the ex ante probability that the process achieves a convention in prob-
ability price equal to p￿.14 Ex ante, there is a positive probability that any p￿ 2 C may be
established as the convention in probability price. In fact, ￿(p￿) > 0 if and only if p￿ 2 C.
Also, p￿










14Consider a graph depicting the potential price path as established by the Markov process de￿ned in the
model as the dynamic price process. Each node in the graph represents the price history achieved up until
that node is reached. The nodes are connected by edges, representing the potential evolution of the complete
price history between periods. Nodes may be classi￿ed by the period of play in which they occur, and each
period-t node can only have one predecessor node in each of earlier periods 1;:::;t ￿ 1. Therefore, there is a
unique path from any node back to the initial node of the game. There may be multiple nodes in representing
the same price history, since the same price history may follow from di⁄erent past histories of play. The
weight of the edges connecting the nodes represents the probability that a node follows from its immediate
predecessor. The probability that a node is observed during the play of a game is the product of the weights
of the edges leading from the node along the unique path of play back to the initial period. The probability
that any game history is observed is the sum of these probabilities across all nodes representing the game
history. In the long run, as established by the previous convention, the process approaches a convention in
probability. When ￿ 2 (0;1), the graph is in￿nite. However, if we consider the graph through a large t, the
majority of paths of play within the graph will clearly approach conventions (where one accepted price, and
one rejected price are announced often enough such that they are observed almost all the time). If we know
the functional forms of the sellers utility functions, and belief preferences, as well as the valuation, we can
estimate ￿ for each p￿ 2 C.
28Alternatively, ￿ may di⁄er across past periods, such that sellers are more likely to observe
recent periods, compared to periods long past. In this case, ￿(￿) is a continuous function
assigning a probability to each of the past periods, where the probability represents to
likelihood that the seller observes the past period. ￿ is the number of period di⁄erence
between the current period and the past period for which the function assigns the probability.
If the current period is t, then ￿ = 1 represents period t ￿ 1, and ￿ = n represents period
t ￿ n. ￿0 (￿) > 0 for all ￿ = 1;2;3;:::, ￿(1) 2 (0;1), and ￿(￿) ! ￿ as ￿ ! 1, where
￿ 2 [0;1). When ￿ = 0, the probability that a seller observes a past period approaches
zero as that period becomes farther from the present period. Alternatively, increases in
time passed may cause the probability of observing a past period to approach some positive
number when ￿ 2 (0;1). It can be shown that when sellers observe past periods according
to function ￿(￿), and when ￿ 2 (0;1), the process almost surely converges to a convention
in probability as t ! 1.
If, alternatively, ￿ = 0, then the process continues to achieve the convention in probability
price ^ pmin part of the time. However, with decreasing probability associated with observing
the upper potential price range bound, there will always be some level of experimentation,
even in the limit, as the probability of observing ^ pmax decreases with time, until it is an-
nounced again. In this situation, the welfare bene￿ts of limited information may continue
to hold, so long as ^ pmin > pmin
pc and the portion of time that the process achieves price ^ pmin
is high enough to out weigh the potential welfare loss during periods of experimentation.
3.5 Long-Term Bene￿ts of Imperfect Information
As shown above, both types of memory limits can result in long-run prices closer to the buyer
valuation than would result if all sellers had perfect knowledge of all past transactions. These
higher long-run prices can mean improved long-term average seller welfare. Long-run average



















pc is the permanent convention price, and ￿ (￿) is the probability that seller ￿ is
drawn to play the stage game in any period.








rrc is the price associated with the repeatedly-reoccurring convention, and ￿￿ rep-
resents the proportion of time, as t ! 1, that ￿ 2 A announces p￿
rrc when she is selected
to play the game. ￿￿ therefore represents the proportion of time the process is in the
repeatedly-reoccurring convention, plus the proportion of time the process is not in the
repeatedly-reoccurring convention but agent ￿ ￿nds it optimal to announce p￿
rrc regardless.
In the limit, as t ! 1, ￿￿ approaches a constant on (0;1] for all ￿ 2 A. Since the process
necessarily leaves the convention regularly over the course of the game, by de￿nition of a
repeatedly-reoccurring convention, there must exist at least one ￿ 2 A such that ￿￿ 6= 1. ￿
without the subscript denotes the total portion of time, as t ! 1, that p￿
rrc is announced
by any agent. Similarly, this value will approach a constant.
If each past transaction has a probability ￿ 2 (0;1) of being observed in any period, the











cip denotes the price associated with the convention in probability.
Average long-term seller utility may be higher when memory is limited to the most recent
















Which is clearly possible, but not necessarily the case. As m ! 1, but remains ￿nite,






! 1. Therefore, this requirement will hold at least
with equality in the limit. If it holds outside of the limit depends not only on the model
parameters, but also on the random draw of agents.
When p￿
cip ￿ p￿





















pc, in the long run, the average seller is strictly better o⁄with under this type
of limited memory.
These results show that under reasonable conditions, at the onset of the game, sellers
may prefer limited, rather than perfect, information of past transactions to be shared with
the randomly selected seller in each stage. Although limited information may result in some
sellers announcing prices that had been rejected by buyers in the past and therefore receiving
zero payo⁄in that period, it may also result in the majority of future seller prices being closer
to the buyers￿valuation. On the other hand, buyers may prefer the sellers to have perfect
information regarding the history of play since it may result in a lower average sale price in
the long-run. This suggests a potential role for consumer advocacy groups to assure that
information regarding past transactions remains available when the sellers themselves do not
￿nd it optimal to implement a system of perfect information sharing.
313.6 Class of Sellers as a Firm
In addition to providing insight regarding the decision process of the individual sellers, the
model can also provide insight regarding ￿rm and employee relationships. Consider class A
as a whole to represent a ￿rm, and the individual members of the class as employees, sales
people, or managers within the ￿rm.15
Where sellers are assumed to only care about the current period, we allow the ￿rms to
place as much weight on future periods as it does on the present period. Firms are risk









We do not directly model the strategic interaction between the ￿rm and the sellers;
however, we acknowledge that such a relationship exists. Firms can in￿ uence employee
risk preferences through the design of promotion and compensation agreements (see for
example Wilson 1968, and Ross 1973). Additionally, ￿rms may be able to in￿ uence seller risk
preferences on a temporary basis through the use of sales contests, quotas, or promotion rules
(Gaba and Kalra 1999). Considering such results in the context of our model, with perfect
knowledge of game history, implementing a contest or other scheme to temporarily increase
seller risk taking will never result in a convention price lower than the original convention
price, so long as the scheme is implemented after the process has already converged to a
potential price range close to the permanent convention price. Because of this, a ￿rm that is
able to temporarily increase employee risk taking may be able to assure long-term revenue
at least as high as it would have been without this ability. Therefore, our model supports
the selective use of sales contests and other means of increasing employee risk taking by the
￿rm, and shows that such tools can increase long-term ￿rm revenues. This results helps
15Alternatively, class A could represent any parent organization who￿ s overall wellbeing is dependent upon
the actions of its individual members. For example, class A may be a trade organization, and each ￿ 2 A
may represent a ￿rm with membership in that trade organization; or class A may represent a family or club,
and each ￿ 2 A could be family or club members.
32justify behavior that is frequently observed of actual ￿rms.
Our model also allows us to consider the impact that a ￿rm may have on long-term rev-
enue if it is able to manipulate price choices by limited seller access to information regarding
past transactions. We assume that the ￿rm can only commit to long-term information shar-
ing policies, and cannot choose how much information to provide on an individual basis.16
Firms can therefore choose policies of information sharing that remain in place for the du-
ration of the game. In the previous sections of this paper, we consider how the process
converges under perfect information of game history, and compare it with cases in which
sellers are only aware of transactions in the most recent m periods, and where sellers ran-
domly observe each past transaction. Here we assume that the ￿rm can commit to policies
that provide any one of these three types of information access.








































pc are possible. Therefore, the ￿rm￿ s long-term
welfare can be higher under either of the types of limited memory. For large enough m, the
16This assumption is justi￿ed given that the ￿rm represents stock holders who do not typically have the
ability to micro-manage ￿rm operations. If ￿rms are able to choose information on a per-transaction basis,
then they would be able to even better use information limits to achieve higher long-run pro￿ts. This is
because ￿rms could manipulate the process similar to the case when sellers have random access to past
period transactions, but ￿rms could also avoid the periods in which prices lower than previously accepted
prices are unnecessarily announced.
33￿rm is never worse o⁄ under m-period memory compared to perfect seller information; and
the ￿rm expects to be at least as well o⁄ under random past period memory compared to











Therefore, employee information limits provide an alternative to more standard compen-
sation tools such as sales contests, quotas, or promotion rules for ￿rms to in￿ uence price
experimentation amongst their employees. Where the more standard tools have direct costs
associated with them, limiting information is costly in terms of potential lost sales as sellers
experiment with prices greater than the buyer valuation.17 In the long run, with an in￿-
nite time horizon, the lost-sales cost is virtually eliminated in the case of random memory.
However, when ￿rms do not actually face an in￿nite time horizon, considering these costs
is important. Even with these costs, limiting information may be the less costly means of
increasing the long-term price compared to the use of more standard compensation tools.
3.7 Multi-Period Sellers
Up to this point, the paper has assumed that individual sellers ignore the e⁄ect their price
announcements have on future-period payo⁄s. This may result if sellers only play the game
once and are replaced in the set A by identical agents after play, or if sellers completely
discount future period utility (discount rate ￿ = 0). However, the results presented in this
paper may continue to hold when sellers play the game more than once and do not completely
discount future-period utility.
Let N denote the number of agents within class A, and ￿￿ 2 [0;1] denote the discount rate
an agent of type ￿ applies to future period utility. ￿￿ = 0 implies that agent ￿ completely
17Direct costs may include prizes for contests, hiring and training costs associated with replacing those
who do not meet high quotas or promotion requirements, and others. Lost sales costs are likely to occur
when standard compensation tools increase seller risk taking, as well as when memory is limited.













+ B (￿￿;N;p) (20)
where B (￿;N;p) represents the expected, discounted increase in utility in all future periods
of the game from announcing price p instead of the price po, where po is the price that ￿ an-









Under the structure of the game previously described, it follows that B (￿;N;po) = 0. More
generally, B (￿;N;p) > 0 if and only if ￿ 2 (0;1] and price p results in higher expected
future period payo⁄ compared to po. Additionally, B (0;N;p) = 0; @B
@￿ > 0; B (￿;N;p) ! 0
as N ! 1; and @B
@N < 0.18
As ￿ ! 0 or N ! 1, all of the results in previously established continue to hold.
However, considering these values in their limit is not required to maintain the results. So
long as N is su¢ ciently large, or ￿ is su¢ ciently small, the results continue to hold.




in at least as high of expected future utility compared with announcing price p = pmin.
This is because choosing p 2
￿
pmin;pmax￿
can result in a smaller potential price range in
future periods, decreasing uncertainty regarding buyer valuation, and potentially causing
the process to converge to long-term convention price ~ p > p￿, where p￿ is the long-term
convention price associated with the original model assumptions described above. However,
this does not imply that ~ p = V￿, only that ~ p 2 [p￿;V￿]. When ~ p < V￿, the sellers can
still receive additional long-term payo⁄ improvements from increasing class risk aversion or
introducing imperfect information.
With other factors held constant, an increase in N or a decrease in ￿ results in an
increase in the range of possible functional forms of
￿ ￿ F￿ (￿);u￿ (￿)
￿
￿2A such that limiting
seller information may result in a higher long-term average sales price. It follows that
18This assumes that the probability that any individual agent is select to play in any given period is strictly
decreasing in N.
35allowing for a ￿nite set of sellers who care about the strategic consequences of their price
announcements does not change the model￿ s fundamental results.
4 Concluding Remarks
Applying learning dynamics to a simple price-setting game provides a framework to analyze
seller-buyer market transactions, where sellers learn about willingness to pay over time. Our
analysis shows how the long-term price depends on the sellers￿risk preferences and ex ante
beliefs regarding the buyer valuation, which supports the use of sales contests, quotas, and
promotion schemes by ￿rms in an attempt to temporarily increase risk taking amongst its
employees. Additionally, the long-term transaction price depends on seller memory, or access
to information regarding past transactions. Surprisingly, limiting seller memory can result
in higher long-term prices, and increase average seller utility. Sellers and ￿rms may therefore
exhibit ex ante preferences for a game in which sellers have imperfect rather than perfect
information of game history.
In addition to the questions addressed in this paper, our model may be expanded to
explore additional issues regarding buyer-seller interactions. There are opportunities to ex-
pand the model to include more complex strategies. One such expansion involves developing
a more detailed analysis of ￿rm-seller interaction in the framework of this model. Such an
expansion would allow for a greater consideration of ￿rm decisions to implement sales con-
tests, quotas, or certain promotion rules. Another expansion may allow for strategic buyers,
which would result in a more complex relationship between the sellers and the buyers. Fur-
thermore, our model currently assumes that the product or service provides the same bene￿t
to all buyers, and that memory is large enough. It would be interesting to consider how
the process behaves if the class of buyers is heterogeneous or seller memory is very short;
speci￿cally, what conditions allow for the conclusions in this paper to be generalized for these
alternative cases?
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5 Proofs
Proposition 14 Proof of proposition 6. Perfect information implies that the potential
price range can only converge or remain constant between periods. If at time t, an ￿ 2 A
is drawn such that pmin








, then the process must
converge. If an alternative seller ^ ￿ is drawn, such that pmin
t 2 argmaxp u^ ￿ (p)
￿
1 ￿ F^ ￿
￿





37the process does not converge and the same information is available to the next seller in pe-
riod t+1. Suppose the process is not in a convention at time t, then there does exist at least
one ￿ such that pmin








. As t ! 1, such an ￿
will eventually be drawn, and the process will converge. However, the process can only con-
verge at most (Vmax ￿ Vmin) 1
￿ times before either pmin = pmax ￿￿ or otherwise there does not




p ￿ ￿ j pmin;pmax￿￿
. In either case,
the process achieves a convention. Since the process only converges, or remains constant, it
remains there inde￿nitely.
Proof of proposition 7. Let the potential price range be [Vmin;Vmax], and ￿x any seller risk
preferences. For all seller types ￿ 2 A, increase f￿ (Vmin) while simultaneously decreasing
the values f￿ (P) for all P 2 (Vmin;Vmax]. As we do this, f￿ (Vmin) ! 1, and for all P 2
(Vmin;Vmax], f￿ (P) ! 0. Continue these transformations keeping f￿ (Vmin) < 1 and f￿ (P) >
0 for all ￿. Since risk preferences are ￿xed, sellers eventually become sure enough that
V￿ = Vmin that even the most risk seeking seller selects p = Vmin. When this happens, Vmin 2
argmaxp u￿ (p)[1 ￿ F￿ (p ￿ ￿ j Vmin;Vmax + ￿)] for all ￿ 2 A, and a permanent convention
is established at price Vmin < V￿.19
Proof of proposition 8. Let m ￿ (Vmax ￿ V￿) 1
￿, which ensures that the lower bound of
the potential price range is never forgotten.
Note that the upper bound of the potential price range will eventually be forgotten. A
rejected price announcement, so long as it is remembered, will not be played again. Therefore,
a rejected price announcement is forgotten m + 1 periods after it is announced. If a upper
bound on the potential price range remains in place for m periods, in the following period,
it is forgotten and the upper bound becomes Vmax + ￿. For the potential price range upper
bound to not become Vmax +￿, after an upper bound is established, a new one must replace it
within m periods. However, there can exist at most (Vmax ￿ V￿) 1
￿ ￿ 1 di⁄erent upper bound
prices. It follows that the process can only last at most m
￿




19Alternatively, this proposition can be changed to ￿x the agents￿ex ante beliefs, and then increase the
risk aversion of sellers until a similar result is established.




de￿ne a graph representing the potential price ranges that may follow from
an initial potential price range [pmin;Vmax]. Each vertex, or node, in the graph represents a
potential price range that may be established. Edges connect the initial node, representing
[pmin;Vmax], to each potential price range that could potentially be established in the period
immediately following [pmin;Vmax], with the exception of [pmin;Vmax] itself. These new vertices
are then directly connected by an edge to new vertices representing each of the potential price
ranges that may immediately follow them, with the exception of themselves and new ranges
that are created by the reversion of the upper bound back to Vmax once it has already converged
to a lower value. Vertices are only allowed to map back to one parent node; therefore,
since potential price ranges may result following multiple parent nodes, there can be multiple
vertices representing a single potential price range. When a potential price range will never
result in further convergence to a new potential price range, it is represented by a terminal
node of the graph, since there are no edges connecting it to sub-nodes. In other words, a




represent the set of lower potential price range bounds included in the ter-
minal nodes of the graph ￿
￿
pmin￿
, with the exclusion of pmin itself. If ￿
￿
pmin￿
6= ;, then as
t ! 1, the process will eventually achieve convergence of the lower bound (even if the upper
bound is forgotten multiple times before convergence eventually takes place). However, it is
only possible for the lower bound to converge at most (V￿ ￿ Vmin) 1
￿ times over the course of




= ;. When this happens, pmin will remain the lower bound of the potential price
range in all future periods. Although each convergence sequence does not necessarily result in




. The price associated with these conventions must be pmin.
Proof of proposition 9. For any ￿xed order of seller draws, it is possible to determine
with certainty the period in which the process would achieve a permanent convention under
39perfect information of past transactions. Denote this period by ^ T. Set memory m such that
m ￿ ^ T and m ￿ (Vmax ￿ V￿) 1
￿. Setting m ￿ ^ T implies that memory is su¢ ciently large such
that the alternative permanent convention is established before periods are forgotten. Addi-
tionally, setting m ￿ (Vmax ￿ V￿) 1
￿ implies that the lower bound on a potential price range
is never forgotten, and that the lower bound can only converge or remain constant between
periods. Therefore, any convention established in periods following the alternative permanent
convention must be at a price at least as large as the alternative permanent convention price.
Proof of proposition 11. Similar to previous proof. By de￿nition of a quasi-homogenous
class of sellers, there exists a memory length ^ T such that for m ￿ ^ T, the process achieves a
permanent convention before any periods are forgotten. Additionally, setting m ￿ (Vmax ￿ V￿) 1
￿
implies that the lower bound on a potential price range is never forgotten, and that the lower
bound can only converge or remain constant between periods. Therefore, any convention
established in periods following the alternative permanent convention must be at a price at
least as large as the alternative permanent convention price.
Proof of proposition 12. As t ! 1, let HA denote the set of all past accepted prices as
well as V min, and HR denote the set of all past rejected prices as well as (V max + ￿). Let H =
HA [ HR, noting that these sets only contain prices, and not formal price histories such as
those that make up Ht. Additionally, de￿ne ^ HR =
￿




p ￿ ￿ j pmin; ^ p
￿￿￿
for all ￿ 2 A and pmin = max
￿
p 2 HA￿
. Note that ^ p 2 ^ HR are necessarily the lowest values
in HR.









is accepted, then the expectation regarding pmin


















changed; and the expectation regarding pmax
t+1 remains unchanged. If pt is rejected, then the
expectation regarding pmin
t+1 remains unchanged; and the expectation regarding pmax
t+1 changes rel-
ative to the expectation of pmax


















































After pmin = max
￿
HA￿
is ￿rst announced as a price, it is observed by the seller in
the following period with probability ￿ > 0. Therefore, eventually, it is observed by a seller
in some period, s. When it is observed, by construction, it must be pmin
s . However, pmax
s
may either be in the set ^ HR or HRn ^ HR. If pmax
s 2 ^ HR, then ￿s selects ps = pmin, which
increases the probability that pmin is observed in any given future period (when pmin was
selected once previously, it is observed with probability ￿; when it was selected in two previous
periods, it is observed with probability ￿2 + 2(1 ￿ ￿)￿ = 2￿ ￿ ￿2). Furthermore, pmax







s ). If pmax



























t 2 ^ HR
i




is drawn, it is
paired with pmax





t 2 ^ HR, it
follows that pt = pmin


















Proof of proposition 13. It is possible to observe any subset of all past transactions.
Therefore, it is feasible that the seller observes the highest past accepted price and the lowest
past rejected price during the ￿rst ￿ periods of the game. As ￿ increases, this becomes less
likely, but is still possible. In this situation, the process converges just as it would under
perfect information during the ￿rst ￿ periods. For ￿ large enough, the process will establish
price p￿
pc prior to period ￿. Since no long-term convention can be established at a price less
than the highest past accepted price, it follows that p￿
cip will be at least as large as p￿
pc in this
case. Therefore, p￿
cip ￿ p￿
pc is possible.
41